The relationship between humans and animals is currently being examined from an ethical perspective within the fields of bioethics and animal ethics. The former (bioethics) correctly observes that life is not a characteristic exclusive to humans, which consequently extends ethical consideration to all living beings, whilst the latter (animal ethics) investigates the intrinsic value of animals and the ways in which they are used by humans as sources of food, companionship, entertainment and for experimentation. Contemporary humans, who are increasingly sensitive to such issues, are confronted with the various conditions under which animals are reared and exploited on an industrial scale, with painful experiments carried out on them, as well as with the numerous painful and often fatal forms of their use for recreational purposes, such as, for example, hunting, fishing, zoos, dog fighting, etc. This sensitivity finds expression in modern social movements in favour of animal protection.
Issues similar to those observed today did not exist in the first millennium of Christianity, a period in which some of the most important Holy Fathers of the Church lived. Nevertheless, humanity’s attitude towards animals did not escape their interest and attention, as it was considered an important part of their spiritual life and their mission in the world. For this reason, the patristic views expressed on the relationship between humans and animals are extensive and, of course, cannot be presented in detail within the scope of this study. We shall therefore limit ourselves to two essential patristic positions 1, which, in our view, are fundamental to the Christian understanding of man’s attitude towards animals. According to the first position, animals and, more generally, the world were created for humankind, whom God appointed to be their lord. According to the second position, man’s dominion over animals is not unconditional or unlimited, since man is not their creator or owner, but is subject to God’s commandments and providence.
The Christian teaching that the world was created for humankind was criticised from an early stage by representatives of Greek philosophy. Celsus, one of the fiercest opponents of Christianity in the second century, sets out, in his work The True Logos (Ἀληθής λόγος) 2, to refute this [Christian] teaching3, which he regards, moreover, to be the very foundation of the entire Christian faith. Firstly, he observes that thunder, lightning and storms do not occur so much for the sake of man as for the sake of trees and plants. And if anyone were to argue that these (trees and plants) grow for the sake of man, in that case they are misinterpreting reality, since they constitute, primarily, the food of wild animals. Man, on the other hand, must labour the land with great effort in order to feed himself on its fruits, whilst animals find their food ready-made. For Celsus, this is clear proof that the earth’s bounty exists, first and foremost, for animals. When Christians put forward the counter-argument that animals exist for man and that he is their master, since he hunts them and feeds on them, the ancient philosopher turns the argument on its head and asks whether it might not be more correct to think that man exists for the sake of animals, since he is often torn to pieces by them and becomes their food. This view is, in his opinion, far more logical, since man needs weapons, dogs and labourers to kill animals, whilst they need nothing extra, as they possess, by their very nature, the weapons and the ability to bring down their prey 4. Finally, Celsus observes that many other living beings, such as ants and bees, live in organised societies, elect leaders, divide their labour and punish the lazy, which is why these traits are not merely special and distinctive characteristics of humankind. Thus, he concludes that the Christian teaching that the world was created for man is meaningless, since man is not a separate entity, and God cares equally for all His creatures 5.
I have quoted these views of Celsus not only to present certain philosophical concepts with which the Holy Fathers of the Church were compelled to contend, but also to show that many of the contemporary views, which are formulated within the framework of biocentrism and ecocentrism, are not entirely original. When an inherent value is attributed to all forms of life and respect for it is demanded, on the basis that the difference between the traits that characterise humans and many animals, such as reason, memory, emotions, sociability and problem-solving ability, is not qualitative but merely quantitative 6, this in fact echoes Celsus’s view that humans do not differ radically from animals 7.
Origen rejects this view and defends the Christian teaching that man holds a position of dominion over creation, which has been entrusted to him by God. Thus, he analyses, one by one, Celsus’s arguments, which he then refutes. To [Celsus’s] assertion that meteorological phenomena, vegetation and the earth’s fertility exist more for animals than for man, since they enjoy the earth’s bounty without effort, whilst man requires tools and much toil to cultivate the earth, Origen counters that man has been endowed by God with reason, ingenuity and creative capacity, which is why he is superior to irrational beings 8. The labour-intensive fulfilment of [man’s] needs represents a special providence on God’s part, which is beneficial to man, as it prompts him to exercise the ingenuity he has received and to invent techniques to meet his needs: “…God, wishing that man’s ingenuity should be exercised everywhere, so that it might not remain inactive and devoid of inventiveness in the arts, made man in need, so that, because of his need, he might be compelled to discover crafts, some for food, others for shelter’9
In response to Celsus’s observation that man cannot be characterised as the master of the world as long as animals are stronger than him, the Alexandrian theologian replies that man, although he does indeed have fewer physical capabilities, he surpasses them through reason and ingenuity. His superiority is, of course, so evident that he manages to domesticate many animals and put them to use in his activities, as is the case, for example, with dogs, which guard flocks and homes; with oxen, which are used in agriculture; and with other animals, which are employed for transport. Their submission to man is the work of God’s providence and a testimony to His sovereign position in the world 10. Finally, regarding the philosopher’s argument that sociability and organisation are not distinctive features of humankind, since many animals possess a remarkable social organisation and follow strict rules, Origen observes that the specific difference lies in the nature of sociability, which, for humans, is rational and conscious, whilst in animals it is instinctive. Thus, whilst animals instinctively follow their nature as objects of divine providence, humans [on the other hand] cooperate with divine providence and freely shape their lives 11.
Origen’s view that man is superior to animals not because he possesses more remarkable physical attributes, but because, as a being created in the image of God, he is endowed with reason, freedom and creative capacity, is widely found in patristic literature. For example, Saint Basil the Great compares man in detail with the mightiest animals on land, in the sea and in the air; he acknowledges man’s weakness in terms of certain physical capacities and emphasises his superiority in respect of the aforementioned traits, which make him their master 12. In addition to this, however, he emphasises that even man’s outward appearance sets him apart from animals and attests to his superiority. Whilst animals look towards the earth and, driven by the instinct of self-preservation, seek to secure their food, man was created by God to stand upright and look towards the heavens. Thus, even from the posture of the body, it becomes evident that animals are oriented towards the earth, whilst man’s perspective is the heavens. In this context, he speaks of man’s kinship with the heavenly realms and of his path towards them: ‘Take heed, if it seems fitting to you, after contemplating the soul, to the structure of the body as well, and marvel at how the perfect Craftsman has created such a fitting dwelling for the rational soul. Of all living creatures, He fashioned only man upright, so that, from this very form, you might understand that your life is of heavenly origin. For all four-legged creatures look towards the belly, whereas man has been granted a gaze raised towards heaven, so that he may not be preoccupied with the belly, nor with the passions beneath the belly, but may direct all his zeal towards the path above.”13 This difference in the outward appearance of man and animals is also emphasised by Saint Gregory of Nyssa, who adds that it highlights the difference in value between the one who rules and those who are ruled 14.
However, it seems that difficulties in understanding the Christian teaching on human dominion over creation 15 were not limited to pagans, but were also experienced by Christians, who observed human weakness in the face of many wild animals. How is it possible for man to be presented as the master of creation, when he proves powerless in the face of many wild beasts? In his reply, Saint John Chrysostom acknowledges that man feels weak in the face of certain wild beasts, which he also fears. However, he observes, this realisation does not invalidate God’s promise, made immediately after the creation of man, that he would rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air, as well as over the wild beasts and the creeping things of the earth. In fact, this was the case in the beginning, for all irrational creatures were subject to man. The reality of man’s dominion is confirmed by two testimonies in Holy Scripture. The first testimony concerns Adam’s naming of the animals, which demonstrates both the authority God entrusted to him over them and his complete lack of fear in their presence. God commanded the animals to come before Adam, so that he might give them names, a command which the Holy Father calls ‘a symbol of dominion (δεσποτείας σύμβολον)’16). The second testimony concerns Eve’s conversation with the serpent. If the wild beasts had instilled fear in man, notes Saint John Chrysostom, Eve would have been troubled and would have fled. Yet she feels no such fear, which is why she converses with him without fear ‘17’.
Therefore, the fear that man feels in the presence of certain wild beasts is not due to their nature or to the order that God has established in creation, but to the commission of sin and the breaking of man’s bond with God. When man had boldness before God, the holy Father writes specifically, he himself inspired fear even in the beasts. After the Fall, however, God deprived man of complete dominion and allowed the feeling of fear towards certain wild beasts to arise. This change in man’s relationship with creation is the consequence of the change in his relationship with God. The reason why fear of certain animals now arises is the sin committed of his own free will, through which man disobeys God 18. However, this fear and the loss of complete dominion over creation are not understood by the holy Father as an evil, but on the contrary, as the greatest proof of God’s love for mankind. He argues this point as follows: if the transgression of God’s commandment had had no consequence, and the honour bestowed upon man to rule over creation had remained unchanged, then he would have persisted in wickedness and would not have sought forgiveness from God. Furthermore, if the loss of dominion had been total and man could no longer have made use of the help of animals, then the cultivation of the land and indeed his very survival would have been extremely exhausting and arduous. For this reason, Saint John Chrysostom concludes, God—who loves mankind—does not completely withdraw the power He has given [to man] over creation, but allows him to place all animals, which are useful for his needs, at his service. He mentions, by way of example, oxen, with the help of which man ploughs the land, and sheep, which provide many necessities for food and clothing. And he concludes as follows: ‘So that both the fact that [God] bestowed honour upon man, and the fact that He withdrew it, and the fact that He instilled in him a fear of wild beasts, and all these things, if one examines them carefully and with gratitude, are full of great wisdom, great care and great love for mankind. For all these things, therefore, let us give thanks to Him and be grateful to the One who has bestowed so many blessings upon us”19
The Christian teaching that the world was created for humankind is also challenged by the argument that some forms of life are not useful, but dangerous to humankind. Saint John Chrysostom notes that nothing was created in vain or without purpose. Moreover, this is confirmed by God Himself, Who declares that everything in the world was created ‘very good’. Of course, humankind is not able to know the purpose of all creatures; nevertheless, in many cases, it understands that their usefulness to humankind is not limited merely to providing food. Thus, for example, trees that bear no fruit provide the timber used to build houses and many other things that meet man’s needs. The same is true of wild beasts and reptiles, since from some of them doctors extract the substances needed to prepare medicines, which help to maintain or restore physical health. Theodoret of Cyrus also highlights these same benefits, adding that every element of creation contributes to its harmonious functioning. As examples of the usefulness of all things, he cites fire and the human body. Fire can burn people, houses and ships, and generally prove to be highly destructive; yet it is one of the four fundamental elements that make up the harmony of the world; Similarly, in the human body one may identify elements that seem superfluous; yet they are absolutely necessary for its proper functioning. Finally, he notes that even fear of wild beasts is not necessarily a bad thing, since it can bring spiritual benefit, namely when a person turns to God in prayer and seeks His help.
Saint Gregory of Nyssa compares man to animals and observes that he is weaker than most of them, a fact which, at first glance, seems at odds with the theological teaching that he is the lord of all creation. As he himself characteristically observes, man comes into the world naked, defenceless, poor and lacking the necessities of life, so that he arouses pity rather than admiration. Indeed, he has no fur to protect his body, nor is he endowed with sharp claws, horns, hooves or a ‘20’ sting. Whilst all animals possess some form of natural weapon to protect themselves, man is entirely without weapons. Furthermore, he is inferior to many of them in terms of size, speed and strength. Does this therefore call into question, or even refute, his dominion over creation, given that man lacks the physical power to assert it?
Saint Gregory of Nyssa answers this question by making a particularly important observation regarding the nature of this dominion, which also constitutes the second patristic position we wish to highlight: what appears, in the case of man, to be a deficiency of nature, becomes the occasion for a dominion that is not based on violence and coercion, but on cooperation. ‘And how,’ someone might ask, ‘could such a being have been appointed ruler over all [animals]? Yet I do not think it is at all difficult to show that what appears to be a deficiency in our nature is, in fact, an opportunity to rule over those subject to us. For if man had possessed such power as to outrun the horse, to have a foot unshakable through stability, to stand on claws or hooves, to bear within himself horns, spikes and claws, then, first and foremost, he would have been a fierce and unapproachable [creature], possessing such attributes developed alongside his body. And, furthermore, it would have overlooked dominion over other living creatures, having no need for any cooperation on the part of those subject to it. Now, however, precisely for this reason, the necessities of life have been distributed amongst all those subject to us, so that dominion over them has become necessary. The slowness and heaviness of the body’s movement led to the use of the horse, and it was tamed. And the nakedness of the body made it necessary to rear sheep, [which] compensates, through the annual gathering of wool, for the deficiency of our nature’21
Thus, according to Saint Gregory of Nyssa, if man had possessed greater physical strength than wild beasts, he would not have sought their company, nor would he have sought to work alongside them, but would have imposed his power and become more ferocious than they. However, precisely because he is unable to meet his needs on his own, he subdues animals in such a way that he works together with them, utilising their qualities for his own benefit. Thus, he compensates for his lack of speed by using horses, his inability to protect his body by using the wool he obtains from sheep, his lack of strength by using oxen to till the land, and his inability to cut certain things, by using dogs, which become for man, as he writes in his characteristic manner, a sort of living knife. When animals cannot directly offer their services, man then draws upon his reason and creative ability to invent crafts that will solve his problems—crafts which, however, once again involve working together with animals, since it is from them that he derives both the ideas and the materials needed to put them into practice. As examples, he cites the movement of birds, which gives man the idea of constructing the bow, with the help of which he can send an arrow through the air at the speed of birds. Furthermore, as a person’s feet are sensitive and vulnerable whilst walking, they take materials from animals to make footwear, which enables them to move more easily and quickly. Thus, with this example, Saint Gregory of Nyssa concludes his exposition of his thought, referring once again to the cooperation with the animals that are subject to man: “The fact that our soles are sensitive and easily injured whilst walking makes cooperation with those subject to us necessary. For it is from there [that is, from animals] that our footwear comes, adapted to our feet”22
The difference between Christian teaching and ancient and modern conceptions—which regard man as equivalent to animals in terms of the protection of life—does not, of course, neither in the notion that divine providence encompasses the whole of creation, nor in the requirement to protect the entire created order; and these two positions express the Christian view of the world that God has created, which man is called to respect and safeguard. The difference lies in the unique position which patristic teaching recognises for humankind, namely that of being the crown of creation and the link between the intelligible and the sensible worlds, having been appointed by God as its steward. This stewardship is not, however, understood as an opportunity to oppress animals, but rather as a responsibility to live in harmony and work together with them, for which man is called to give an account before God.
Translated from the Greek and annotated by Ion Marian Croitoru.
- 1
It should be emphasised that patristic teaching is specific to Orthodoxy and, by extension, to the Orthodox Church throughout the world (translator’s note).
- 2
This work by Celsus, which is dated to around 178, has been preserved almost exclusively through the fragments quoted by Origen in his work Against Celsus (Κατὰ Κέλσου), in which this important ecclesiastical writer refutes all the accusations that Celsus levels against Christianity. For more on the life, philosophical views and works of Celsus in English translation, and on early polemics against Christianity in general, see Joseph Hoffmann, Celsus on the True Doctrine. A Discourse Against the Christians, Oxford University Press, New York, 1987.
- 3
To aid understanding of the text, I have added, in square brackets and with the author’s consent, clarifications, nuances, etc. (translator’s note).
- 4
Joseph Hoffmann, Celsus on the True Doctrine, pp. 82–83. We also cite Origen’s work, as it is largely through this that Celsus’s work has been preserved: Ωριγένης, Κατὰ Κέλσου (Origen, Against Celsus), 4, 74–75: Marcel Borret (ed.), Origen Against Celsus, Volume II (Books III and IV), Introduction, Critical Text, Translation and Notes, [SC 136], Paris, 1968, pp. 366–372.
- 5
Origen summarises Celsus’s position as follows: ‘Furthermore, using many examples, [Celsus] accuses us of maintaining that all things were made by God for the sake of man. And he seeks, through his account of animals and the intelligence displayed by them, to demonstrate that all things were by no means created any more for human beings than for irrational animals (διὰ πολλῶν δ᾽ ἑξῆς ἐγκαλεῖ ἡμῖν ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ φάσκουσι πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὸν θεόν. And he intends, from the account of the animals and the affinity apparent to them, to show that notwas created for the sake of humans rather than for the sake of irrational animals)
- 6
Tom Regan, Animal Rights, Human Wrongs: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2003, pp. 35–39. For a summary of [Celsus’s] views in favour of animal rights, see Tom Regan, ‘The case for animal rights’
- 7
Christoph Cardinal Schönborn, Man, the Image of God. The Creation of Man as Good News, published by Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2011, pp. 32–36.
- 8
Origen, Against Celsus 4, 76: Marcel Borret (ed.), Origen Against Celsus, p. 374. An answer to the question of whether the irrational nature was created for its own sake or for man is also provided by Nemesius of Emesa, who argues that it is illogical to believe that beings who lack wisdom, but merely follow the impulse of nature and show their submission through the position of their bodies, which are oriented towards the earth, were created for their own sake: ‘It is therefore appropriate to examine carefully whether the nature of irrational animals was created for its own sake or for man. But it is probably meaningless to say that beings lacking wisdom, who live solely according to their natural instincts, and who, being bent towards the earth and showing their servitude through the posture of their bodies, were created for their own sake (It is therefore a matter for consideration whether the nature of irrational beings was created for its own sake, or for the sake of man. But perhaps it is absurd to think that, being devoid of reason and living solely by natural instinct, and bent low towards the earth, and signifying servitude through their form, to say that they were brought forth of themselves)
- 9
Origen, Against Celsus 4, 76: Marcel Borret (ed.), Origen Against Celsus, p. 374: ‘God, wishing to train human understanding in every respect, so that he might not remain idle and unskilled in the arts, He made man in need; so that, through this very need, he might be compelled to devise arts, some for sustenance, others for shelter
- 10
Origen, Against Celsus 4, 78: Marcel Borret (ed.), Origen Against Celsus, p. 380: ‘Thus, the Creator created all animals as servants of the rational animal [, that is, of man,] and of his natural ingenuity (∆οῦλα οὖν πάντα τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου καὶ τῆς φυσικῆς αὐτοῦ συνέσεως κατεσκεύασεν ὁ δημιουργός)
- 11
Origen, Against Celsus 4, 81–82: Marcel Borret (ed.), Origen Against Celsus, pp. 384–388.
- 12
St Basil the Great, Discourse I on the Creation of Man: On Being Made in the Image (St Basil the Great, Discourse I on the Creation of Man: On Being Made in the Image), 9–10: A. Smets, M. van Esbroeck (eds.), On the Origin of Man, pp. 186–194.
- 13
Basil the Great, Homily on ‘Take Care of Yourself’ (St Basil the Great, Homily on ‘Take Care of Yourself’) 8, in PG 31, 216 C: ‘Take heed, if it seems right to you, after the contemplation of the soul and the constitution of the body, and marvel at how the master craftsman has fashioned it as a fitting dwelling for the rational soul. Of all living creatures, he fashioned man alone to stand upright, so that from this very form you might recognise that your life comes from a higher origin. For He has created all four-footed creatures to crawl towards the earth, but for man, the gaze is directed towards heaven, so that he may not be preoccupied with the belly, nor to the afflictions below the belly, but to direct all its impetus towards the ascent above
- 14
“Man stands upright, his form directed towards the heavens, and he looks upwards. From the very beginning, these features have signified his royal dignity. For the fact that, of all beings, only man has such a form, whilst all others have bodies bent downwards, clearly shows the difference in value between those who are subject to dominion and the power that rules over them (Ὄρθιον δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ σχῆμα, καὶ πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνατείνεται, καὶ ἄνω βλέπει. These too are fundamental, and they signify the royal dignity. For man alone amongst all existing things is such, whilst the bodies of all others are inclined towards the lower realm, clearly demonstrates the difference in worth between those who submit to tyranny, and those whose authority rises above them)
- 15
Or of creation (translator’s note).
- 16
John Chrysostom, Commentary on Genesis, Homily IX (St John Chrysostom, Commentary on Genesis, Homily IX), 4, in PG 53, 79. See also ibid., Homily III on Genesis, 2, in PG 54, 591–592.
- 17
Ibid.
- 18
‘I do not deny that we now fear wild beasts, that we are terrified, and that we have lost our mastery over them. But this does not mean that God’s promise was false. For in the beginning things were not like this; rather, the wild beasts were afraid, trembled and obeyed their Master. However, when man lost his boldness [towards God] through disobedience, then the attributes of his power were partly diminished (For the fact that we now fear the beasts, and are terrified, and have fallen from our former position, I do not dispute; but this does not prove that God’s promise is false. For in the beginning things were not arranged in this way, but the beasts were afraid and trembled, and submitted to their master. But since it lost its boldness through disobedience, and the foundations of authority were undermined)
- 19
‘So that both the bestowal of honour, and the subsequent withdrawal of it, and the realisation of the fear of wild beasts, and everything else, if anyone were to examine them carefully and with gratitude, would be filled with great wisdom, great guidance, and great philanthropy. For all these things, then, let us give thanks to him, and let us be grateful to him who has bestowed so much upon us
- 20
‘But man is, on the one hand, devoid of natural shelter, and on the other, unarmed and poor; in what he needs for his life, he is dependent on others; on the face of it, he is more worthy of pity than of anyone’s favour; he is not endowed with horns for defence, nor with sharp claws, nor with armour or teeth, nor with any sting naturally containing a deadly venom, as most living creatures possess – [things] with which they are endowed for defence against those who harm them (Ἀλλὰ γυμνὸς μὲν τῶν φυσικῶν σκεπασμάτων, yet man is defenceless and destitute, and is brought into this life lacking everything necessary for survival, seeming, on the face of it, more worthy of pity than of blessing, not armed with the horns of a ram, nor by the strength of his claws, nor by weapons, nor by a sting, nor by any other means possessing a naturally deadly venom, such as most animals possess within themselves for defence against their tormentors)
- 21
‘And how,’ someone might ask, ‘has such a person been chosen to hold this office, which is held by lot?’ But I do not think it difficult to show, that what appears to be a need of our nature is a means to the mastery of the senses. For if man possessed such power as to outrun the horse in speed, yet keep his foot unshaken by steadfastness, relying on certain weapons or spurs, whilst bearing horns, stings and claws within himself; at first it would be a beast-like creature, and a troublesome one, with such features fused to its body. But then it would have disregarded the authority of others, needing no assistance from his limbs. Now, however, for this very reason, the necessities of life have been apportioned amongst each of those joined to us, so as to make their authority over us a necessity. The sluggishness of the body, being cumbersome, the horse was brought to serve the purpose and tamed. The nakedness of the flesh, however, necessitated the care of the sheep, as the annual shearing of the sheep’s fleece replenished what was lacking in our own nature
- 22
‘For the bases, being pliable and easily moulded, are essential to us on our journey, which makes the co-operation of the lower limbs necessary. For it is there that the sandals must be fitted to the feet