Goodness is a moral quality that we attribute first and foremost to God, and then to intelligible beings. It is one of the divine attributes mentioned in textbooks on Dogmatic Theology and refers to a moral quality which we perceive God to possess 1. Generally speaking, this reflects in people’s consciences the way in which God manifests Himself to the world.
The general moral meaning of goodness makes it a moral concept independent of any religious context, and it relates to certain character traits in human beings 2. Here we have human goodness, which is perceived by one’s fellow human beings as a form of kindness, consistency, solidarity, encouragement and charity – in other words, all those qualities that contribute to a person’s well-being. It is also a relative concept in terms of perspective, as it reflects one’s personal measure of things.
Kindness is a concept deeply linked to the will, for it is cultivated voluntarily. This presupposes a choice, namely free will on the part of the person who cultivates it. Its foundation is the freedom which Saint Gregory of Nyssa describes as the ‘deliberative faculty’ (3). Father Dumitru Stăniloae shows that the person, as a unified and self-aware entity, possesses freedom to the highest degree 4 and, at the same time, being to the highest degree. From this it follows that freedom is directly linked to goodness, for it is the conscious choice of a relationship of love and acceptance between God and humankind, or between human beings and their fellow human beings.
From the perspective of the theology of the image, human beings are endowed with freedom 5. No one can be in the image of God unless they possess freedom 6. Only human beings are made in the image of God, because they have freedom instilled within them, so that they can decide what they will become. Freedom, therefore, is a characteristic that enables human beings to determine their own destiny, that is, to become whatever they will. And what he wills is what defines him. God is not good merely in a passive sense, for no form of passivity or dependence can be ascribed to Him; thus, what He is is assumed through His divine will. Therefore, if, for His divinity, goodness is a form of volitional and personal assumption, then it is self-determination and, by implication, all His attributes which we study in dogmatic theology or moral theology are in fact acts of self-determination, not of dependence 7. That is why they have been called attributes, more because they are observed by humans than because they in any way determine God to be thus, beyond the volitional aspect.
Therefore, in order to define goodness, we must necessarily include the notion of will, as it is a voluntary outcome. And the volitional function is specific only to personal entities, endowed with freedom. Consequently, one cannot say that something is good unless goodness is a personal and freely conscious manifestation. Goodness is not a passion; that is to say, it does not belong to any essential determination or set of innate and fixed attributes that dictate a predetermined course of behaviour, but belongs solely to free choice. That is to say, those beings which are instinctive and cannot engage in freely chosen behaviour, controlled by their own perception, and which are not governed by the desire for meaning, cannot manifest goodness as a conscious choice, but rather as a certain passive trait of their nature to be peaceful. That is to say, they are this way because they cannot be otherwise, whereas personal beings are this way because they choose to be so and do not choose to be anything other than what they are.
One cannot say that something is good unless goodness is a personal and freely conscious manifestation. Goodness is not a passion; that is to say, it does not belong to any ontological determination, or to a set of innate and fixed attributes that dictate a predetermined course of behaviour, but belongs solely to free choice.
In a certain sense, for personal beings who choose to be in a certain way, that choice is an act of consistency with their reason for being. God, as a being—or rather, as a super-being—chooses to be in accordance with what He is, even though what He is is due to His own choice, not to any predetermined pattern of His being. As far as God is concerned, being and the freedom to be coincide, so that God is what He wills, with no fact determining that He should be in a particular way. But the way in which He is perceived by creatures—specifically those with consciousness, namely humans and angels—reveals Him to be of a certain nature, namely good.
Goodness is a trait that God reveals in relation to His creatures. Revelation, as God’s self-disclosure, reveals Him in this capacity of being good. Like this attribute, His other attributes are also things observable by created consciousnesses. What we perceive God to be is not all that He is, but only certain aspects of what He is, and not to the full extent to which He reveals Himself to be. Thus, He is more than He reveals Himself to be, and deeper than can be observed from His self-revelation. Of course, under these circumstances, the natural question arises as to whether God is different from what is seen in Him, in the sense of whether there is a correspondence between what He is and what He reveals Himself to be. A question such as this is not particularly appropriate for a devout approach to God, for if we were to accept it, there would be certain logical consequences that would not do justice to God, including His very nature as God—that is, His holiness and truth. Therefore, we cannot admit that God reveals Himself as anything other than what He is, for then He would present a false identity in relation to what He is. Nor can it be suggested that God is in a certain way and reveals Himself as something other than what He is. Yet it is often in human nature to present themselves as being other than they really are, that is, by making certain adjustments to impress upon the minds of their fellow human beings a controlled image of themselves. However, in God’s case this is not possible, for He is consistent with Himself; that is to say, as He is within Himself, so He is without Himself (in His relations with creation).
It is often in people’s nature to present themselves as being different from what they really are, that is, by making certain adjustments to instil in the minds of their fellow human beings a controlled image of themselves. But in God’s case this is not possible, because He is consistent with Himself; that is to say, as He is within Himself, so He is without Himself.
The attribute of God’s immutability, or His consistency with Himself, also implies a consistency between what He is and what He affirms of Himself in relation to creation. God’s consistency implies a concordance between being and word, such that God is not duplicitous, but is exactly what He says He is. Any other form of discrepancy between ‘being’ and ‘the communication of being’ is impossible; so from this point of view, all divine Revelation is just, complete and credible; it is, in short, an absolute and unadulterated act of truth, because God does not reveal Himself to humankind as being anything other than what He is. Furthermore, the purpose of the creation of man as an intelligible being lies in the act of knowing, and this act presupposes the meaning of truth. That is to say, knowledge in any sense other than that of truth is absurd; nor can man’s knowledge of God be approached in terms of a deliberate distortion.
Nevertheless, people know in different ways. Revelation is an objective act which reveals all that God is, condensed into the concreteness of human understanding, which is obviously limited. So if there is continuity and absolute fidelity between the so-called divine ontology and the act of its revelation, whilst the creature’s reception of Revelation is an act that distorts it, then the discontinuity lies in its reception. What God is is perceived in a differentiated manner, and this is due to internal interpretative frameworks, which cause a reality to appear in created consciousness as slightly different from what it is. This phenomenon of distortion produced by created consciousness is due to a flawed relationship with what God is, through the distorted criterion of interpretation based on the self of the interpreter. In this case, an erroneous, non-objective relationship to what it means to be human means that all interpretations arising from this criterion become, in turn, distorted. And this non-objective perspective stems from man’s view of himself as the sole source of truth, which validates reality. Within this exclusivism, other criteria of interpretation are not valid and, by implication, no other forms of understanding Revelation are accepted. Thus, man will understand reality through the prism of what he is, that is, through the sum of his needs, because he generally has a tendency to reduce the valid universe to the sum of his needs. This autarchic perspective on knowledge, when extended to the knowledge of God, no longer makes a faithful knowledge of Him possible, but rather a slightly altered one. Thus, the perspective on God’s goodness as one of His attributes, insofar as it is known, is one reflected by this mode of interpretation, which leaves a slightly modified nuance for dialectical theology.
This correction is achieved through experience, that is, through experiencing God as He is, through direct dialogue with Him, through the work of the Holy Spirit who enters into human endeavour and directs it towards a more accurate knowledge than that provided by theoretical knowledge of God 8. Rather, the latter refines the former; that is to say, everything we know about God is realised through the acquisition of information about Him, but the refinement of this initially conceptually crude perspective is clarified through the experience of a personal union between God and humankind. Only then is the knowledge of God a complete, faithful and full phenomenon, in which Revelation is consistent with its reception. And as an argument for this, we find the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit, which opens the minds of the Lord’s disciples so that they may understand the Scriptures or grasp the meaning of the mission of the incarnate Son of God. Likewise, the direction of the relationship between man and God is determined by the work of God Himself within man’s consciousness, enabling him to perceive Him correctly. As we can see, knowledge is not an absolute act unless there is an ontological involvement of the knower in relation to God. And if there is no absolute knowledge, then it does not possess the full truth, but becomes fragmentary.
The meaning of God’s goodness is interpreted in terms of this free and conscious connection with God, which defines the quality of goodness. In everyday language, particularly in colloquial usage, the term ‘good’ signifies many things and therefore has a broad semantic range. In its basic sense, ‘good’ signifies a benevolent, encouraging and tolerant quality, in which the personality of the person who perceives someone as ‘good’ discerns in the one considered ‘good’ the possibility of providing a framework for their ontological expression, development and the affirmation of their will. Thus, the sense of goodness is learnt alongside the criterion of the possibility of unrestricted development. Furthermore, there is also a criterion of intelligibility by which we may bestow the label ‘good’ upon someone. Someone may be good because they provide a personal space in which things are compatible or fitting, appropriate in themselves and within their own context. Often, in childhood, we say that when someone has a positive, approachable and encouraging attitude, they are good. The classic image of a good person is that of someone who does us good or makes us feel good. But even this sense of ‘good’ is a debatable matter, because it refers to a symptom, not to an essential goal that has been achieved. We often use the term ‘well-being’ when referring to the body or to a positive, optimistic and stable mental state, in which the soul is joyful, expansive and creative. But these characteristics are merely indicators perceived by humans, on the basis of which they understand what is good. Yet the good can be more than that, because the experience of a particular state does not necessarily equate to the good. Goodness can be more than human subjectivity, because the world of consciousness is a subjective one, and those who live solely within it experience a limited universe and a method of phenomenological reduction. However, the good is not a moral category that must be reduced to one’s own subjectivity; in other words, it is not the inner self that possesses the real knowledge of the good. Therefore, anyone who believes that simply because they feel good they are partaking in an objective good may be mistaken. Good is more than merely the sensation of it, for it is an objective value. Thus, only God possesses the absolute perspective on goodness, and this provides a basis for human reference systems to take God—and His perspective on goodness or the category of the good—as their point of reference. This exclusivity of God in being good at the absolute level is supported by the words of the Lord Jesus Christ, who addresses the rich young man: ‘Why do you call me good? No one is good except God alone’ (Luke 18:19). This reference is intended to indirectly testify to the Lord Jesus Christ as God incarnate, for the question is a rhetorical one.
No one is good, because creation is marred by an imperfection resulting from its rebellion against God, which renders it incapable of realising this principle of goodness. It seeks goodness, but does not attain it unless God reveals it to it. Creation does not generate goodness of its own accord, for it cannot love more than God loves, nor can it be more self-sacrificing than God is in relation to it. Creation is good because it is the result of God’s work, of His absolute intention and wisdom, so even if it is good in that its existence is appropriate, it is not good in a functional sense through its own intentions or aspirations—especially those of conscious creation—because the latter does not always choose God as the source of goodness, but drifts towards its own version of goodness. We cannot therefore assert that the world is not good, that is to say, that its existence is a mistake because, through its free will, it is in error; rather, we assert that the world is perfectible, having the potential to attain this highest level of goodness only if it remains connected to God as the source of goodness. To postulate a good outside this source, which is God, indicates an error of judgement.
Creation cannot generate goodness by itself, for it cannot love more than God loves, nor can it be more self-sacrificing than God is in relation to it.
People often have this tendency to believe that what is good for them is what they themselves believe, overlooking the fact that God is the source of goodness. Furthermore, the vast majority of people regard themselves as their own source of truth, seeing themselves as part of a system that is autonomous from everything else. And whatever accords with this closed, self-contained system of theirs they call good, whilst whatever does not accord with it they call evil. Thus, their separation from God creates the conditions for a different frame of reference regarding the concept of good—namely, a false one. This is the meaning of Christ’s dialogue with the rich young man: that goodness does not mean all his wealth, his youth, or his virtue, for Scripture says that from his youth he had kept all God’s commandments; but ‘good’ in the fullest sense means what Christ tells him: to renounce all worldly things and follow Him, that is, to obey Him and be involved in a mission of His Providence. This was the true good, or the true state of well-being that a person experiences, not social fulfilment in terms of the world’s common logic, expressed through status, resources and youthful vigour. Nor can virtue in itself, as a discipline of the personality, be called the good unless it is directed towards following Christ. Therefore, following Christ as the full meaning of the good entails man’s inclusion in a mission to which God calls him. Man’s prophetic mission—the spreading of the Gospel through the relevance conferred by the personal example of living authentically and wholeheartedly—is in fact the good, for it attests to God’s presence within man, in his very being, in his will and in his works. God calls every person, during their lifetime, to a form of service, to a form of obedience that takes various forms, ranging from external social ones to internal personal ones, depending on which this following of Christ is realised.
The Lord also states on another occasion that the exclusive possession of goodness belongs to God alone. ‘If you, then, though you are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father in heaven’ (Luke 11:13). This expression signifies a distinction between the human conception of goodness and God’s way of being good. There is a difference between these two kinds of goodness, for the former is manifested according to human logic, whilst the latter is according to God’s wisdom. In other words, all people perform a form of good in relation to themselves, but they do not perform the absolute good in relation to God.
Goodness implies providing a context for manifestation, development and initiative; a space for volitional movement, for becoming and for the realisation of one’s own ontology. Therefore, the good is a concept that denotes a person’s attitude of providing a context or fostering ontological growth and fulfilment. In this sense, there is a direct proportionality between freedom and the good, since only the condition of exercising freedom offers the opportunity to bring about or experience the good, for the good is itself a choice, a form of relating or a form of selection. For this to be realised, free will is necessary both for the one who provides the context for experiencing the good and for the one who experiences it. Therefore, from this perspective, if the good implies a provided context, surely the best provider of this framework is God, Who, through His divine power, makes it available as the optimal space for experiencing the good and for the manifestation of creaturely freedom to experience the good. What ensures this framework—both on God’s part towards creation and amongst human beings themselves—is the will of the One who provides it and the will of the one who consents, so that they may act responsibly within this volitional framework. It is precisely the plane of the will that provides the space for the exercise of freedom.
Good, as a state experienced by a beneficiary, can be approached from the perspective of the manifestation of that person’s freedom. And the good as real aid, as salvation from existential nonsense, from an eternal torment towards which man is purposefully heading, is another way of approaching the good. In this case, the good experienced as a state of well-being is one thing, whilst the good as the avoidance of an ontological catastrophe is quite another. People often refer to the former as ‘good’ and relate to it as such. Something seems good to them when it brings about a sense of well-being, that is, when they experience feelings of joy and happiness. But they do not have a complete perspective on reality, as I stated above, nor a complete one on themselves, so they do not know exactly what the good is, because they do not understand its meaning. Meaning is found only in a personal relationship with God; that is, it is then that all things, deeds and events take on meaning and become intelligible. That is why Christ the Saviour says that He is the Light of the world, for He helps man to decipher the correct, full and effectively applicable meaning of every thing. Communion with God illuminates the horizon of our knowledge and perception; that is to say, we acquire a discernment of the senses, in which we become free from passion and enlightened by the reason for the existence of every thing. In this state, the senses are transformed and are no longer receptors associated with sin. The senses, enlightened by divine reason, regard things not as ends in themselves, but as means to the end that is God.
Good, understood as reciprocity, is the result of a perspective tainted by sin. Therefore, it can only be good if it is free and has a single meaning. The freedom of the good implies that it is not conditioned by anything; that is to say, the one who provides the context for the exercise of the will does not restrict but rather offers this volitional freedom, without making it conditional upon anything. Reciprocity is rather a form of social protection, designed to prevent certain abuses that people commit at a collective level. Of course, kindness as a trait can also be subject to such a distortion, so that it becomes an object of exchange or barter, forming part of a contractual or conditional relationship. But in this case, it can no longer be morally termed kindness, because goodness is an intentional moral quality, not a utilitarian one. When goodness is the object of an exchange, it becomes part of a utilitarian principle, in which the aim is the self-interest of the one offering goodness, not the goodness being offered. In this case, the beneficiary is the one who offers, not the one to whom it is offered. Therefore, for the concept of good to be complete, it must avoid this perspective and be gratuitous, that is, with a single direction of intention: from the giver to the recipient. When there is also a reciprocal response, an interpersonal dialogue does in fact arise, but this reciprocal response cannot be interpreted as a form of conditioning, for it too was brought about by the same unambiguous reasons. It must not be confused with utilitarian ‘good’, which is in fact a pseudo-good.
Modern society is built on mercantile principles which provide a model of moral behaviour, particularly for younger generations, that is equally mercantile in its approach to emotions. Relationships are often formed there on commercial criteria, and a form of goodness is practised that is conditioned by reciprocity or a so-called ‘currency of exchange’. These models cannot be called goodness in the true sense of the word.
The goodness to which our Saviour Christ calls us is more than mere reciprocity. ‘If you do good to those who do good to you, what credit is that to you? For even the pagans do good to those who do good to them’ (Luke 6:33). These words show that the true measure of goodness is not determined by any equivalent in this world, and that it is not a feeling produced by the limitations of this world, but by the grace of God which dwells within man. God, as the Giver, bestows goodness without needing anything in return and without ever demanding any reciprocity. God is an inexhaustible source of goodness because He bestows it in this way; therefore, the good that a person performs has the same inexhaustible origin, for it is not drawn from their own existential resources, but from a source that is God’s inexhaustible gift. Therefore, whoever does good in this uncorrupted, irreversible and unconditional manner resembles God, Who is inexhaustible. In this sense, the words spoken by the Father to his elder son, who was obedient to him, can be interpreted: ‘Son, all that is Mine is yours…’ (Luke XV, 31), thereby emphasising that if anyone does a good deed—in the case of the elder brother, the patience and tolerance shown in restoring his prodigal brother to the status of a son with the necessary gifts—it is God who enables them to do so. That is to say, goodness is, in its origin, the inexhaustible source of God’s grace, through which He works all that exists in an integrated manner towards His purposes. Here he understands that His divine grace is nothing other than His common interpersonal work (the work of the Persons of the Holy Trinity). It is never the case that man works for the good in isolation or autonomously, but rather he works together with God so that the gnoseological reference in the Psalms may be prophetically fulfilled: ‘God is marvellous in His saints, the God of Israel’ (Psalm LXVII, 36).
…the true measure of goodness is not determined by anything of equal value in this world. … The goodness that man performs has the same inexhaustible source, for it is not drawn from his own existential resources, but from one that is the inexhaustible gift of God.
Imitating God’s goodness is a challenge for the human condition, because this can never be fully realised from the perspective of man’s autonomous thinking. From this point of view, the notion of the good is a relative one, as it is constructed on a type of reasoning derived from man’s ontological position. In defining this aspect, we start from the premise that no one can reach God unless they call upon Him, seek Him, engage in dialogue with Him, receive Him, or constantly maintain the will to be in His company. And this pre-divine positioning of humankind also influences the way in which they think, that is, the way in which they perceive reality. From this arises a certain system of values, in which the notion of the good takes the form of this system. At the top of a system of values lies what is most precious or important, and those things, and their attainment, actually constitute ‘good’ for the person who conceives them.
For example, for someone whose values are centred on self-esteem and social prestige, the concept of ‘good’ will be defined for them in terms of that self-esteem. That person will regard the good as any situation or opportunity to fulfil their self-esteem or gain prestige in society, in the eyes of others. Another example is provided by the model of the passionate individual, who defines normality in terms of their passion, labelling as ‘good’ whatever aligns with their passion and, conversely, labelling as ‘bad’ whatever does not align with it or stands in the way of their desires. We observe here that people tend to call good that which is in accordance with their will and evil that which is contrary to it. Therefore, it is impossible to conceive of a relative attribute of the good, for the good is not a notion that can be defined at one’s discretion, but is an objective, absolute concept.
The social good that we observe in the form of charity is often something other than good in the sense of God’s work. As I have shown above, good is an attribute of God, and charity is an expression of His goodness. In the context of human interaction, charity is one of the acts that usually validates goodness. In other words, those who practise charity demonstrate that they are good. However, from a utilitarian perspective, the question arises as to the meaning of charity, because what a person offers as charity to those in need may be motivated by various reasons.
Some people practise charity to be praised and appreciated; others do so for popularity, that is, to pose as philanthropists and gain social prestige; others are compelled to repay, through charity, a favour once done to them by someone; whilst others simply use charity as a bargaining chip to win someone’s affection or as a pretext to obtain something from the recipient. All these situations provide an opportunity to show that charity is not strictly the act it purports to be in a formal sense, but that in assessing it, an informal aspect should be taken into account, namely the intention behind the act of charity. If charity is a result of goodness, then it can be called charity in the truest sense; but if other motives lie behind the act of charity, then it is already undermined, and its condescending nature is called into question. True charity is, therefore, a result of one’s goodness, but not all formal acts of charity are charity in the true sense. Goodness results in charity, but charity should not always be interpreted as a symptom of goodness. The causal relationship runs from goodness to charity, not from charity to goodness, because goodness underlies charity; charity does not generate goodness. Charity as a sign of goodness involves a certain discernment, which is exercised according to the purpose of the charity. If charity is based on anything other than the selfless goodness felt by the giver, then it is a bargaining chip for something else.
Goodness results in charity, but charity should not always be interpreted as a sign of goodness. … If charity is based on anything other than the selfless goodness felt by the giver, then it is a bargaining chip for something else.
Solidarity is often found in society, and it is based on a social good. This is predominantly material in nature, as it provides for the means of subsistence for those in need of social assistance. But alongside this, there is also a spiritual purpose aimed at providing a form of social guidance; that is, it creates a certain environment for the conscience of those who are unable to come to terms with a change in social status or who cannot be integrated for psychological reasons. Social solidarity is based on the concept of the good as a particular sense of satisfaction and, at the same time, of psychological balance. Social solidarity, in practice, both in theory and in application, embodies charity as a principle of mutual aid, often unpaid, often on a voluntary basis, without any expectation of return. It is the result of a constant human need to support one’s fellow human beings, manifested through the instinct for the security of the species based on the group.
Social good differs from spiritual good in that the social perspective views doing good differently from the perspective of a mystical Christian life. In the former case, the good is understood as something external, superficial, which relates more to the material aspect of human existence and to one’s role as a consumer in the social sphere of life. Social good, in the common understanding, implies having the material means to acquire consumer goods, adequate material resources, or the individual’s capacity to produce these material means. Therefore, within the logic of a political system, the good relates to material well-being, which is often promised during election campaigns and which, in an educational sense, fosters a flawed view of the good, in the materialistic sense indicated in the previous reference. Yet few political systems view the good beyond its material aspect, that is, by situating it within a spiritual framework. Consequently, contemporary society takes as its sole reference the ‘good’ as expressed through social rights and freedoms, and through economic opportunities designed generally to satisfy physical comfort and to encourage people’s individual desires towards a culture of the body, so that spirituality, too, serves this purpose. Thus, in this context, the good implies the hegemony of the material world over the human spirit, and the justification for this is provided by a theory of values dictated by the need for social equidistance. This means that the standard of social governance focuses solely on the external or material aspect of life and less on the spiritual, where differences between people were more evident and sometimes irreconcilable. Society’s concern for spiritual well-being often takes the form of allowing associations based on religious criteria, through the freedom to express one’s own beliefs, and through the freedom for people to form groups based on shared affinities. A society must respect all its members equally and treat them as such. Therefore, the concern for the good of all takes the form of a common good, which means a good that can be experienced by everyone. And the most accessible common ground is the material one, followed, to a lesser extent, by the spiritual one.
Spiritual good refers to the existential state attained on the basis of the presence of Christ within a person and of spiritual belonging. It differs from social good in that it is not always experienced as good, especially by those who are to some extent enslaved by their passions. Therefore, those who do not live in God and do not see their relationship with Him as a necessity of their lives fail to perceive spiritual good, which is real. Such a person interprets goodness in terms of external symptoms of the material world, not according to God’s economy. The latter can only be perceived if a person engages in a certain collaboration (co-operation) with divine grace, for only that makes God’s economy relevant to them and reveals it to them in their conscience. The good in the spiritual life is the goal of God’s providential action, and this is manifested throughout a person’s life through the whole range of events and circumstances they go through, both beautiful experiences that are felt as good, and the most burdensome or ‘concrete realities of life’, as Father Dumitru Stăniloae calls them 9. Good in this form is true good, as opposed to pseudo-good experienced as a personal state, a physical state or a social state, and it redefines the way in which a person, with their own judgements, ought to relate to the idea of good. And the first step towards this realisation is to understand that God is the source of all good, He Himself being the Good, rather than seeking it elsewhere or in certain personal psychophysical symptoms or signs.
Anyone who does not live in God and does not see their relationship with Him as a necessity of their life fails to perceive spiritual goodness, which is real. Such a person interprets goodness in terms of external symptoms of the material world, rather than according to God’s economy. The latter can only be perceived if a person engages in a certain collaboration (co-operation) with divine grace…
- 1
See Fr. Dumitru Stăniloae, Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, vol. 1, in: Complete Works, vol. 10, Basilica Publishers, Bucharest, 2018, p. 286: ‘Saint Dionysius considers that the most appropriate designation for the divine subsistence—which also distinguishes it from all else—is that of goodness or super-goodness’.
- 2
Fr. Dumitru Stăniloae, Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, vol. 1, p. 290: “From God’s love for His creatures springs their love for Him, and therefore their love for Him cannot be separated from His love.”
- 3
Saint Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man, in: Works, PSB series, vol. 30, ed. IBMBOR, Bucharest, 1998, p. 22: ‘Man possesses a superiority that is evident in his unrestricted freedom, by virtue of which he is able to govern himself freely according to his own will.’
- 4
Fr. D. Stăniloae, Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, vol. 1, p. 152.
- 5
Fr. D. Stăniloae, Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, vol. 1, p. 410.
- 6
Fr. D. Stăniloae, Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, vol. 1, p. 412.
- 7
St Cyril of Alexandria, On the Holy Trinity, PSB, vol. 40, ed. IBMBOR, Bucharest, 1994, pp. 60–61.
- 8
‘The Holy Spirit who fills all that is lacking’ is a phrase from a prayer recited by the bishop during the ordination service, and it refers equally to a gnoseological correction of the human being, which aligns the perception acquired through theory with an accurate perception, shaped by the actual experience of God. In this context, the dispute—well known since the Middle Byzantine period—concerning the supremacy of one form of knowledge of God, whether through dialectical reasoning or through the experience of a connection with Him, as exemplified by the dispute between Saint Simeon the New Theologian and Stephen of Nicomedia, or between Saint Gregory Palamas and Varlaam of Calabria, or, as Alexandr Golitzin argues in his references to the work of Saint Simeon the New Theologian, that there are two forms of hierarchy corresponding to the two forms of theology mentioned above: priestly authority and spiritual authority.
- 9
Fr. Dumitru Stăniloae, Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, vol. 1, pp. 143–148.